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Mathias Thaler 
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/// 
This is the pre-print, pre-proofread version of a paper to be published in 
the Review of Politics. 
/// 
I am interested in a political art, that is to say, an art of ambiguity, contradiction, 
uncompleted gestures and uncertain endings. An art (and a politics) in which 
optimism is kept in check and nihilism at bay. 
 
To say that one needs art, or politics, that incorporate ambiguity and contradic-
tion is not to say that one then stops recognizing and condemning things as 
evil. However, it might stop one being so utterly convinced of the certainty of 
one’s own solutions. 
William Kentridge1 
                                               
1 The first quote is cited in: Michael Godby, “William Kentridge: Retrospective,” Art Journal 58, no. 3 
(1999): 83, https://doi.org/10.1080/00043249.1999.10791955. The second quote is from: Carolyn Chris-
tov-Bakargiev and William Kentridge, “Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev in Conversation with William 
Kentridge (1999),” in William Kentridge, ed. Rosalind Krauss, October Files 21 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2017), 21. 
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Setting the Stage2 
Picture this: on a theatre stage, a three-headed dog called Brutus nervously awaits his 
sentence in a criminal trial. The verdict, spoken in a stern voice from high above, es-
tablishes an “unequal culpability” for each head. The first head is that of a politician, 
who the judge asserts cannot be held responsible for how his grand vision of society 
has been practically realized – he is acquitted and released from detention to enjoy a 
happy retirement. The second head is that of a military general, who has, according 
to the judge, not been engaged in any wrongdoing himself, but an “example has to be 
made” – as punishment, he is condemned to take over the leadership of the state’s 
newly formed army. Finally, the third head belongs to a low-ranking foot-soldier of 
the regime. Now the judge enumerates the heinous crimes committed by this torturer, 
and convicts him to 212 years in prison. The episode ends with the three heads vi-
ciously biting each other, culminating in one terrifying howl: “Amnesty!”3 
                                               
2 This paper results from conversations with four colleagues who have been exceptionally generous 
with their advice and feedback: Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Bronwyn Leebaw, Andrew Schaap 
and Olga Taxidou kindly provided me with written comments that greatly expanded my initial views 
on this topic. Sincere thanks are also due to Maria-Alina Asavei, Lawrie Balfour, Thomas Brudholm, 
Jaco Barnard-Naude, Toby Kelly, Mihaela Mihai and Deborah Silverman for sharing their thoughts on 
this paper. I presented earlier versions during workshops in Prato (Italy), Oslo (Norway) and Stellen-
bosch (South Africa, via video-link). The audiences at these events helped me to refine and improve 
my arguments. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to the Editor of the Review of Politics, Catherine 
Zuckert, for expertly guiding the paper through the refereeing process, and to five anonymous review-
ers for their helpful suggestions and observations. The remaining errors are mine, of course. 
3 Jane Taylor, Ubu and the Truth Commission (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1998), 63. 
 3 
How can we make sense of such an intriguing scene? And why should political theo-
rists devote attention to a theatrical performance like this? This short episode stems 
from the South African play Ubu and the Truth Commission, first performed in May 
1997, while the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was still oper-
ational. The three-headed dog Brutus is impersonated by an impressively mobile pup-
pet with a suitcase as belly, containing plenty of evidence to incriminate its owner, the 
eponymous Ubu, played by a human actor, and the story’s central figure. Unusually, 
the puppet handlers are fully visible to the audience and sometimes even serve as 
actors themselves. The judge’s voice is that of William Kentridge, the director, whose 
face looms menacingly on a screen behind the stage. And it can surely be no coinci-
dence that the foot-soldier’s sentence, which triggers the call for an amnesty, is exactly 
the same as the one handed out to Eugene de Kock (aka “Prime Evil”), one of the 
Apartheid regime’s most notorious killers.4 
As this vignette hopefully evokes, watching Ubu and the Truth Commission is at the 
same time stimulating and frustrating, mystifying and thought-provoking, anxiety-
inducing and outrageous.5 The main reason for the spectator’s disconcerting experi-
ence is that the play narrates the horrors of Apartheid with the support of a multitude 
of estrangement devices, from life-sized puppetry, to operatic songs, animated films 
                                               
4 Shane Graham, South African Literature after the Truth Commission: Mapping Loss, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 46. 
5 For a video of the play, which I have consulted in my interpretation, see: Handspring Puppet Com-
pany, Ubu and the Truth Commission (Full Feature), accessed January 24, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVgT_x53z14. 
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and verbatim victim accounts. Clearly, Ubu and the Truth Commission stages transi-
tional justice in a way that is completely different from the heavily orchestrated pro-
ceedings of the TRC. Whereas the TRC was driven by the determination to heal a bro-
ken community, Ubu and the Truth Commission profoundly reconfigures the represen-
tations of perpetrators, bystanders and victims of violence. In the theatre, the very 
process of overcoming Apartheid, and its underlying ideal of reconciliation, is pub-
licly examined and put on trial. 
It is one of this essay’s key contentions that cultural re-enactments, such as the various 
plays created in reaction to the TRC, promote a “form of democratic political educa-
tion, not merely a salve for old wounds”6. This pedagogical role can be fulfilled by 
diverse art forms, from film and theatre to poetry and sculpture, but they all aspire to 
shed new light on the conclusions reached during the transition period. 7 
Ubu and the Truth Commission is emblematic of such cultural re-enactments, which is 
why political theorists should take the play seriously. It has the capacity to assist us 
in drawing out the contours of an alternative type of reconciliation that accepts the 
continued existence of deep differences in post-conflict settings, yet demands a pro-
ductive re-articulation of identities in transitional moments. By unpacking the com-
plex functions that a particular kind of estrangement (estrangement for, rather than 
                                               
6 Stephen L. Esquith, “Re-Enacting Mass Violence,” Polity 35, no. 4 (2003): 513, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/POLv35n4ms3235451. 
7 For example, cultural re-enactments can problematize the responsibility of bystanders in a manner 
that is wholly alien to the victim-perpetrator model underwriting legal procedures. See: Stephen L. 
Esquith, The Political Responsibilities of Everyday Bystanders (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Press, 2010), 149–82. 
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from, the world) may perform in processes of transition, I thus lend credence to an 
understanding of reconciliation that contrasts with the TRC’s restorative conception: 
what Andrew Schaap calls “agonistic reconciliation”8. 
In the broadest sense, the paper seeks to contribute to a better appreciation of the shift-
ing interface between aesthetics and politics. Building on earlier debates within the 
tradition of Critical Theory around the place of culture in modern societies9, this in-
terface has over the past two decades been illuminated from a great variety of angles, 
concentrating, for example, on the role of cinematic and novelistic storytelling in com-
ing to terms with evil and on the multiple knowledge practices pertaining to the study 
of global politics.10 Strangely, with a few notable exceptions11, theatre – the essay’s 
                                               
8 Andrew Schaap, Political Reconciliation, Routledge Innovations in Political Theory 15 (London: 
Routledge, 2005). See also: Andrew Schaap, “Agonism in Divided Societies,” Philosophy & Social Criti-
cism 32, no. 2 (2006): 255–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453706061095. 
9 Ernst Bloch et al., Aesthetics and Politics (London/New York: Verso, 2010); see also: Russell A. Berman, 
Modern Culture and Critical Theory: Art, Politics, and the Legacy of the Frankfurt School (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Christoph Henning, “Theories of Culture in the Frankfurt School of Critical 
Theory,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory, ed. Michael J. Thompson, Political Philosophy and 
Public Purpose (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 255–78. 
10 Roland Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics (Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); 
Garry L. Hagberg, ed., Fictional Characters, Real Problems: The Search for Ethical Content in Literature (Ox-
ford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); María Pía Lara, Narrating Evil: A Postmetaphysical The-
ory of Reflective Judgment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
11 J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1990); Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, The Wellek Library Lectures 
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main focus – has remained at the relative margins of political theory’s horizon of prob-
lematizations. The paper hopes to widen this horizon through a dialogue across dis-
ciplines, whilst acknowledging that others have recently taken systematic steps in the 
same direction.12 
The argument proceeds as follows: The next section outlines the agonistic view of rec-
onciliation and explains why it is more cogent than the restorative one. I then continue 
by reconstructing the notion of estrangement within aesthetic theory, proposing a dis-
tinction between estrangement for, and estrangement from the world. The subsequent 
step leads me to apply this conceptual framework to the interpretation of Ubu and the 
Truth Commission. In the conclusion, I flesh out some of the wider implications for 
theorizing political reconciliation. 
Before resuming my discussion, a proviso on the paper’s goal is required: In this essay, 
I maintain, by way of an inductive argument grounded in a specific case study, that 
art works can have a tangible impact on real-world politics, through the employment 
of estrangement devices that enable world-disclosure. The plausibility of this idea will 
likely depend on how narrowly we construe “impact”. 
                                               
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Bonnie Honig, Antigone, Interrupted (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013); Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliott (Lon-
don: Verso, 2009). 
12 Tony Fisher and Eve Katsouraki, eds., Performing Antagonism: Theatre, Performance & Radical Democ-
racy (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Margot Morgan, Politics and Theatre in Twen-
tieth-Century Europe: Imagination and Resistance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 7 
To avoid a misunderstanding from the start, my argument does not hinge on the over-
drawn assertion that art works on their own and in isolation from other societal in-
struments can make a significant difference in post-conflict settings. The stage play I 
shall analyze below responds to a specific constellation of power, namely the South 
African reconciliation process post-Apartheid. Within this empirical setting, it would 
be vacuous to claim that even the most powerful piece of theatre, such as Ubu and the 
Truth Commission, will have any lasting effect on society at large, unless deeper trans-
formations of material and socio-economic structures of inequality and oppression are 
set into motion as well. 
So, if art’s impact is not to be mistaken for producing monocausal, unilinear change, 
how should we comprehend it? The background presupposition on which this article 
rests is inspired by Hannah Arendt’s thought that “theatre is the political art par ex-
cellence; only there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art.”13 In her 
theorizing, Arendt assigned theatre – or more precisely, Greek tragedy – this place of 
excellence because she was convinced that action itself was only possible when citi-
zens appeared in the public sphere and thereby commenced inter-acting with each 
other as equals. In other words, on Arendt’s view, “democratic politics is itself highly 
theatrical”14. 
While the reverse conclusion (that theatre is intrinsically democratic) undoubtedly 
seems wrong, political art at its best enables citizens to expand their imaginative vistas 
                                               
13 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 187. 
14 Richard Halpern, “Theater and Democratic Thought: Arendt to Rancière,” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 
(2011): 548, https://doi.org/10.1086/659358. 
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by “seeing the world from other points of view […] in order to develop a capacity for 
independent judgment”15. The claim about theatre as a vehicle for world-disclosure is 
hence at the same time more limited and more ambitious than simply surveying a 
play’s directly observable impact (such as audience numbers, awards, translations, 
adaptations etc.)16: it foregrounds the elusive, yet genuine, potential of art works to 
alter how we envisage ourselves and others, as members of a political community. 
From Restorative Justice to Agonistic World-Disclosure 
The purpose of this section is to sketch a robust theory of political reconciliation that 
envisions agonistic relations as catalysts of “unsettlements” in the aftermath of vio-
lence. The starting point for this reflection is, by contrast, the widely-held assumption 
that reconciliation is best achieved in moments of closure where a moral community 
comes together once the wounds of the past have healed. Let us unpack its main fea-
tures to weigh both its ostensible strengths and its structural weaknesses.17 
                                               
15 J. Peter Euben, “Arendt’s Hellenism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Richard 
Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159. 
16 For a comprehensive study of the complex role of theatre audiences see: Susan Bennett, Theatre Au-
diences: A Theory of Production and Reception, 2nd ed (London/New York: Routledge, 1997). 
17 A note on the very distinction between restorative and agonistic reconciliation: it is designed to be 
heuristic, rather than deductive. This means that I hope to cover a number of relevant family resem-
blances that most adherents to the restorative view share. However, this also implies that there is a 
zone of fuzzy intermediary positions, which incorporate features of the agonistic view as well. For an 
excellent example see: Ernesto Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political Vio-
lence (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009). 
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Numerous political theorists have scrutinized restorative justice’s basic tenets, which 
all revolve around the notion that true reconciliation needs to culminate in a re-con-
stituted community, which has overcome the fierce divisions of the past.18 The process 
whereby reconciliation in a restorative key proceeds moves from the perpetrators’ 
acknowledgement of past wrong-doing to the making of amends through reparations 
or apologies, finally terminating in the victims letting go of resentment and granting 
forgiveness. On this view, the formerly estranged parties to a conflict successfully for-
sake their alienation and recognize the unity of the community to which they all be-
long. 
One of the reasons why the notion of reconciliation as restorative justice has held such 
sway on the public imagination is to do with its frequent invocation during one of the 
most notorious reconciliation processes of the past 30 years: the South African TRC.19 
                                               
18 Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
19 Barbara Arneil and Jason Tockman, “The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission,” Contemporary Political Theory 14, no. 4 (November 1, 2015): e1–4, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2014.50; David Dyzenhaus, “Debating South Africa’s Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 49, no. 3 (1999): 311–14; Bronwyn Leebaw, 
“Legitimation or Judgment? South Africa’s Restorative Approach to Transitional Justice,” Polity 36, no. 
1 (October 2003): 23–51. 
 10 
The TRC was heavily imbued with the Christian rhetoric of atonement and redemp-
tion.20 Its chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, made recurrent reference to the need for 
national healing in the aftermath of the Apartheid period.21 Tutu’s emphasis on social 
harmony, associated with ubuntu’s supposition of fundamental human connected-
ness, further strengthened the TRC’s commitment to restorative justice, both on the 
individual and the collective level.22 South Africa’s transition process was thus gov-
erned by a “therapeutic moral order”23, in which the traumas of the past were sup-
posed to be confronted through cathartic truth-telling and through the release of anger 
and hatred. The wider ramifications of South Africa’s restorative justice paradigm 
have then been traced in a variety of other political contexts.24 
                                               
20 Megan Shore, Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009). 
21 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999); Desmond Tutu and 
Douglas Carlton Abrams, The Book of Forgiving: The Fourfold Path for Healing Ourselves and Our World 
(New York: HarperOne, 2014). 
22 Michael Battle, “A Theology of Community: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu,” Interpretation 
54, no. 2 (2000): 173–182. 
23 Claire Moon, “Healing Past Violence: Traumatic Assumptions and Therapeutic Interventions in War 
and Reconciliation,” Journal of Human Rights 8, no. 1 (2009): 73, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830902717726. 
24 Ruti Teitel associates the restorative model with a particular historical phase of transitional justice 
mechanisms, where criminal trials were replaced with truth commissions: Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing 
Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 56–57. See 
also: Mahmood Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid 
Transition in South Africa,” Politics & Society 43, no. 1 (2015): 61–88. 
 11 
Given the prevalence of this framework, one might ask what could be problematic, 
normatively as well as practically, about this image of reconciliation. Andrew Schaap, 
and several authors following his lead, has provided us with the most persuasive an-
swer to that question. Schaap’s chief observation involves that the restorative model 
misconstrues what is genuinely political about reconciliation in the aftermath of vio-
lence: the agonistic, or conflictual, dimension that is characteristic of all human inter-
actions. On this account, the moral basis on which reconciliation qua restorative justice 
is founded appears problematic. The following passage summarizes Schaap’s ap-
proach effectively: 
Rather than seeking to restore a unity predicated on a common identity, polit-
ical reconciliation would presuppose a plurality of potentially incommensura-
ble perspectives, not only between the communities to which perpetrators and 
victims belong but among them. Rather than being sustained by the fraternal 
warmth of shared suffering, reconciliation might be realised through common 
enjoyment of the world. Instead of the benign indifference of toleration, politi-
cal reconciliation would entail a willingness to engage others in a passionate 
and often agonistic discourse about the world we share in common.25 
Underpinning this conception of reconciliation is Hannah Arendt’s idea that power is 
exercised “whenever people get together and act in concert”26 with each other. This 
means that power both depends on, and is enabling of, a common world that is shared 
by those who collectively engage in politics. When Schaap speaks of the importance 
of constructing a “common world”, he uses the term in precisely this Arendtian sense: 
insofar as politics crucially hinges on acting in concert with others, the commonality 
of the world is never simply given; it constantly needs to be invoked, negotiated, 
                                               
25 Schaap, Political Reconciliation, 4. 
26 Hannah Arendt, “On Violence,” in Crises of the Republic; Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience on Violence, 
Thoughts on Politics, and Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 151. 
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shaped, challenged and disputed. In other words, the common world in which power 
thrives is itself the product of struggle and conflict, as much as it is the result of con-
certed attempts to collaborate and find shared ground. This agonistic dimension, 
Schaap maintains, needs to be embraced in post-conflict moments. 
At the heart of this agonistic conception of political reconciliation thus lies a claim 
about the relationship between the actors who seek to reconcile and the social setting 
within which reconciliation is pursued. Schaap argues that political reconciliation is 
predicated on a leap of faith insofar as the “we” that is appealed to in the moment of 
transition does not yet exist. Rather, the “we” towards which all reconciliatory politics 
strives is essentially a high-risk wager. The necessary orientation towards a common 
world, which is never simply “out there”, but must be created through the productive 
collision of plural standpoints, is called “worldliness” in Arendt’s terminology. If this 
orientation wanes away, the common world collapses. 
Appeals to restorative justice must then be denounced as implicit disavowals of poli-
tics: in order to eschew the hazard of rupture, they present reconciliation as a process 
beyond struggle and conflict.27 In so doing, they postulate a community that ends up 
                                               
27 The foregrounding of struggle and conflict also sets the agonistic approach on a different track from 
deliberative models of reconciliation and transitional justice, which emphasize the importance of rea-
soned justifications for political claim-making. For a prominent defense of the deliberative view in the 
context of the South African TRC, see: Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democ-
racy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 6: The Moral Foundations of Truth Commis-
sions. For a thorough rebuttal, see: Sarah Maddison, “When Deliberation Remains Out of Reach: The 
Role of Agonistic Engagement in Divided Societies,” in Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 189–205. 
 13 
being “wordless”, anchored in the intimacy of kindred spirits, yet lacking the plurality 
that typifies political action. Although it is easy to comprehend why one would desire, 
in a post-conflict setting, to gloss over and minimize the differences that had led to 
violent altercations, it is myopic to invoke the existence of a “we”, which merely needs 
to be restored, without also accounting for the agonistic relations that will necessarily 
persist in the common world to come.28 
The agonistic dimension of political reconciliation has received sustained attention 
from fellow theorists. To give just three recent examples: Mihaela Mihai has shown 
how negative emotions, such as resentment and indignation, can be appropriated for 
identifying aspects of reconciliatory politics where victims have not been properly 
acknowledged and engaged with.29 In a similar vein, Danielle Celermajer discards the 
notion that apologies in the service of political reconciliation merely concede past fail-
ings in order for society to “move on”. Rather, as collective rituals, they are performa-
tive speech acts that go beyond the sincere declaration of misdeeds.30 Finally, Lawrie 
Balfour demonstrates that the language of reparations can become an effective means 
                                               
28 Schaap, Political Reconciliation, 81–137. Especially Arendt’s thoughts on forgiveness, which Schaap 
discusses in depth, are relevant for our topic. Arendt argued that forgiveness is essential for dealing 
with the irreversible nature of the past. Human action, for Arendt, depends on the possibility “to be 
released from the consequences of what we have done” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 237.) 
29 Mihaela Mihai, Negative Emotions and Transitional Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2016). 
30 Danielle Celermajer, The Sins of the Nation and the Ritual of Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009). 
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for social renewal. Interpreting W. E. B. Du Bois’s writings, Balfour conclusively es-
tablishes how a reconciliatory politics based solely on equal citizenship strategically 
erases traces of the violent past.31 
What these reconstructions of political reconciliation share, despite their obvious dif-
ferences, is a sober vision of post-conflict society defying the ideal of restoration.32 
Attentiveness to negative emotions, apologies and reparations thus demonstrates how 
agonistic relations can thrive in post-conflict situations without preparing the ground 
for further violence. 
Estrangement as an Aesthetic and Political Category 
My objective in this section is to home in on a specific aspect of agonistic reconciliation 
that has thus far received less attention in the extant debate: the mechanism by which 
world-disclosure is effectively accomplished. One way of achieving world-disclosure 
is, counterintuitively, through the experience of estrangement. The concept of es-
trangement has its origins in literary theory, dating back to the Russian formalist 
                                               
31 Lawrie Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois, Transgressing 
Boundaries (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
32 For yet another book that explores similar themes, see: Sonali Chakravarti, Sing the Rage: Listening to 
Anger after Mass Violence (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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Viktor Shklovsky, but with even deeper roots reaching into Hegel’s and Marx’s phi-
losophy at least.33 For the sake of concision, I will concentrate on the story commenc-
ing with Shklovsky’s writings from the early 20th Century.34 Shklovsky’s concept of 
ostranenie (translated into English either as defamiliarization or estrangement) was 
first developed in an article from 1917 called “Art, as Device”.35 Ostranenie describes 
a specific technique by which things that we habitually consider well-known and com-
mon are presented from a new and surprising perspective.36 Instead of focusing on 
the realistic depiction of a scene or character, the estranging technique makes visible 
the very process by which art works are created. Here is how Shklovsky summarizes 
this view: 
                                               
33 Carlo Ginzburg, “Making Things Strange: The Prehistory of a Literary Device,” Representations, no. 
56 (1996): 8–28, https://doi.org/10.2307/2928705. 
34 Douglas Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht, Parallax (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). On formalism in literary theory see: Julie Rivkin and 
Michael Ryan, eds., Literary Theory: An Anthology, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pt. 1: 
Formalisms: Russian Formalism and New Criticism; Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
34 Viktor Shklovsky, “Art, as Device,” trans. Alexandra Berlina, Poetics Today 36, no. 3 (2015): 151–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-3160709. For a recently published collection of Shklovsky’s writings 
in English, see: Viktor Shklovsky, Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader, ed. Alexandra Berlina (New York: Blooms-
bury Academic, 2016). This book also contains a helpful introduction to Shklovsky’s thinking, by Alex-
andra Berlina. 
35 Shklovsky, “Art, as Device.” 
36 J. A. Cuddon, “Defamiliarization,” ed. Matthew Birchwood et al., A Dictionary of Literary Terms and 
Literary Theory (Malden/Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2013). 
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And so this thing we call art exists in order to restore the sensation of life, in 
order to make us feel things, in order to make a stone stony. The goal of art is 
to create the sensation of seeing, and not merely recognizing, things; the device 
of art is the “estrangement” of things and the complication of the form, which 
increases the duration and complexity of perception, as the process of percep-
tion is, in art, an end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is the means to live 
through the making of a thing; what has been made does not matter in art.37 
The application of this technique within literature is wide-spread. For instance, Tol-
stoy’s writings capture that which is normally perceived as familiar with a shocking 
naivety, “describing it as if seen for the first time, as if happening for the first time”38. 
Miguel de Cervantes and Lawrence Sterne are other examples of authors who fre-
quently employ the technique of ostranenie.39 In this sense, estrangement is sparked by 
a stubborn refusal to take settled meanings and conventional understandings for 
granted.40 
Estrangement as an artistic device has had an astonishing career. Looking back at his 
own conceptual innovation 50 years earlier, Shklovsky noted with amazement how 
far the idea had travelled.41 Certainly the most influential way in which the notion of 
ostranenie has been later revised was through Berthold Brecht’s theory and practice of 
                                               
37 Shklovsky, “Art, as Device,” 162. 
38 Shklovsky, 163. 
39 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose (Elmwood Park: Dalkey Archive Press, 1991). 
40 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, “The Subversive Potential of Leo Tolstoy’s ‘Defamiliarisation’: A 
Case Study in Drawing on the Imagination to Denounce Violence,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, 2018; Liza Knapp, “The Development of Style and Theme in Tolstoy,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 161–75. 
41 Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature, 79. 
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epic theatre.42 What Brecht calls Verfremdung (translated into English as either es-
trangement, alienation or distanciation) is closely related to Shklovsky’s basic con-
cept.43 For Brecht, however, the desired effect of Verfremdung exceeds that of “making 
things strange”: on stage, it unravels an intricate process whereby the audience is sup-
posed to become fully conscious of the distance between its own idiosyncratic, ideo-
logically imbricated standpoints and the scene on stage. Like Shklovsky, Brecht 
sought to lay bare the mechanisms through which art is being crafted, expecting that 
the theatre visitors would draw their own conclusions from what is being shown. 
Importantly, Brecht alleged that epic theatre needed to avoid generating “the crudest 
form of empathy”44 on the part of the audience. Politically and artistically, feeling em-
pathy can be a treacherous reaction because it permits the spectators to assimilate the 
experiences conveyed on stage to their own life-worlds.45 On Brecht’s view, critical 
thinking can only occur once the viewers become aware of the artificiality of what is 
                                               
42 Bertolt Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre,” in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, 
by Bertolt Brecht, ed. John Willett (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), 179–205. 
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45 This negative appraisal of empathy echoes Arendt’s scathing view of compassion as solitary, unpo-
litical “co-suffering”. Arendt conceived of compassion as an a-political emotion that is unable to sustain 
freedom and plurality. See: Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 81–85. 
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being staged. As Fredric Jameson observes with regard to Brecht’s method, “the spec-
tacle as a whole should try to demonstrate to the audience that we are all actors, and 
that acting is an inescapable dimension of social and everyday life”46. Developing his 
theatrical vision over a long period of time and in collaboration with a stable group of 
actors – the famous Berliner Ensemble – allowed Brecht to explore various aspects of 
the V-Effekt.47 
In view of the subsequent discussion, it is important to note that estrangement on 
stage is not opposed to affects and passions per se. Rather, Brecht surmised that artis-
tic interventions needed to permanently subvert the audience’s tendency to look for 
catharsis.48 For Brecht, political art must carefully navigate between the extremes of 
anodyne hyper-rationalism and full emotional immersion.49 As Darko Suvin poign-
antly remarks, “Brecht’s main orientation […] is therefore a refusal of empathy as the 
be-all and end-all in favor of precisely graded and argued sympathy. Sympathy means, 
even etymologically, ‘feeling with’ (as opposed to empathy’s ‘feeling into’)50.” 
                                               
46 Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method (London/New York: Verso, 2000), 25. 
47 David Barnett, A History of the Berliner Ensemble, Cambridge Studies in Modern Theatre (Cam-
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48 Brecht’s rejection of catharsis is especially relevant for our engagement with agonistic reconciliation, 
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Aesthetics (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2014), 55–80. 
50 “Emotion, Brecht, Empathy vs. Sympathy,” Brecht-Jahrbuch, 2008, 64. 
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This point also matters for Arendt’s thoughts on theatre as the “political art par excel-
lence”. Even though the V-Effekt was designed to undercut emotional identification, 
which Brecht associated with the Aristotelian tradition51, in practice the Greek tragedy 
seems to have served specific purposes that, in some respects, resembled that of es-
trangement.52 Geared towards the critical self-interrogation of the polis, tragedy was 
instrumental in sustaining democracy – through the cultivation of civic judgment. As 
Peter Euben’s perceptively notes: 
Interested in the interplay of passion and reason, tragedy not only sought a 
balance that enhanced both, but provided an example of such balance in its 
very form. Probing the shaping force of institutions and traditions, tragedy was 
itself a political institution and part of a tradition. Educating the judgment of 
the political community, it thereby nurtured an audience capable of appreciat-
ing what it was and did.53 
Before investigating the complex machinations of Verfremdung in a concrete drama, I 
need to further probe the linkages between aesthetics and politics. While it is relatively 
straightforward to grasp how Brecht conceived of these linkages – his theory and prac-
                                               
51 For a helpful reconstruction of the argument, see: Angela Curran, “Brecht’s Criticisms of Aristotle’s 
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tice of stagecraft was, after all, highly didactical and openly oriented towards eman-
cipation54 – Shklovsky’s case requires a little more unpacking. For it is undoubtedly 
the case that ostranenie was primarily understood as a literary method, with restricted 
reach beyond the world of novels, at least during the initial phase of the debate. What 
is more, the formalist movement came from the 1920s onwards under mounting So-
viet pressure for its bourgeois “cosmopolitanism”, leading to the dissolution of all lit-
erary organizations in 1932.55 As we have remarked above, the refusal to simply accept 
things as they appear to be underpins estrangement as an artistic technique, both in 
Tolstoy and in Shklovsky. In what ways, then, does this attitude also serve as a primer 
for social critique? 
Svetlana Boym’s answer to this question is instructive, especially given the paper’s 
main concern with reconciliation. Boym detects a profound, yet largely unappreci-
ated, resonance between Shklovsky’s reflections on estrangement and Hannah Ar-
endt’s notion of world-disclosure. Her main claim entails that “ostranenie was never 
an estrangement from the world, but estrangement for the sake of the world’s re-
newal”56. It would be a misunderstanding to conceive of estrangement solely in terms 
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of an imaginative turn away from the world. This type of estrangement goes hand in 
hand with a waning orientation towards the common world, which inevitably triggers 
apathy, distrust and anxiety amongst citizens.  
Even though an influential tradition envisages estrangement along these lines, arising 
notably from the celebration of Stoic withdrawal and Romantic introspection, an al-
ternative kind of reasoning can be unearthed as well. Surprisingly, Hannah Arendt’s 
account of world-disclosure allows us to take a step towards positively valorizing es-
trangement. On Boym’s reading, estrangement for, rather than from, the world is pred-
icated on a passionate commitment to worldly affairs that counteracts the alienating 
effects of withdrawal and introspection. This is where the nexus between Arendt and 
Shklovsky emerges most vividly: 
[E]strangement for the world is an acknowledgment of the integral human plu-
rality that we must recognize within us and within others. This is a way of see-
ing the world anew, a possibility of a new beginning that is fundamental for 
aesthetic experience, critical judgment, and political action.57 
We can now sense how the aesthetic dimension of estrangement bears on the political 
realm. If maintaining freedom hangs on the construction of a common world in which 
differences are both affirmed, negotiated and altered, then estrangement can turn into 
a dynamic stimulus for defending freedom. Refusing to take settled meanings and 
conventional understandings for granted ensures that the members of the public 
sphere remain vigilant about any drive towards anti-pluralistic closure. Arendt called 
                                               
57 Boym, 602. 
 22 
this peculiar ability “thinking without a banister”58: a mode of judgment that would 
not have to rely on the assurances of traditional belief systems. 
In sum, this section has argued that overcoming estrangement is not a precondition 
for attaining an ethic of worldliness. On the contrary, making things strange and see-
ing the world anew can serve as effective bulwarks against the decline of the common 
world. Distance, of the right kind, is pivotal for grappling with the other in an agonis-
tic fashion. Estrangement may thus support, rather than undermine, collective re-
newal. As Boym astutely writes, the totalitarian erasure of the public sphere engen-
dered a “combination of extreme scientism and mysticism or conspiratorial think-
ing”59. In other words, estrangement turns suspicious at precisely that moment in time 
when freedom is obliterated.60 
This remark about the co-implication of estrangement and world-disclosure, found in 
both Arendt and Shklovsky, is pertinent for the discussion around political reconcili-
ation. Recall how authors who cast doubt on the restorative justice paradigm extol the 
positive features of continuous contestation in post-conflict settings. Albeit considered 
perilous, appeals to negative emotions, apologies and reparations manage to disrupt 
the standard narrative of closure promoted by those who desire to rebuild a broken 
                                               
58 Hannah Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. Melvyn 
A. Hill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 336–37. 
59 Boym, “Poetics and Politics of Estrangement,” 603. 
60 With a view to the next section, it is worthwhile noting that, in a short piece, Boym also applies her 
reading of estrangement to William Kentridge’s oeuvre, focusing on an installation from 2008. See: 
Svetlana Boym, “Defamiliarized Human,” in The Off-Modern (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 107–12. 
 23 
polity in the image of an organic unity. The peculiar variant of world-disclosing es-
trangement explored in this section can assist us in shattering that image, opening up 
a path for political reconciliation in an agonistic key. 
The World Disclosed by Ubu and the Truth Commission 
Since constructing a common world is contingent on the ability to see the world anew, 
it becomes imperative to reflect on the cultivation of the most fruitful kind of estrange-
ment, both as an artistic device and as a political technique. This section examines in 
detail how this goal may be approached – on stage and in the auditorium. My guiding 
intuition here is that Ubu and the Truth Commission exhibits exactly those qualities that 
Boym ascribes to estrangement enabling world-disclosure. This is so because the 
play’s depiction of perpetrators and victims simultaneously disallows audience iden-
tification and prompts affective engagement: in conjunction, these mechanisms com-
pel the viewers to see themselves and others in a new light. 
Ubu and the Truth Commission is a theatre piece penned by Jane Taylor and directed by 
William Kentridge. Kentridge is today one of South Africa’s most successful and 
revered artists, whose oeuvre over the past 30 years spans drawings, animations, films 
and dramaturgy.61 Taylor, a writer and academic, has collaborated extensively with 
South Africa’s famous Handspring Puppet Company.62 The play’s development has been 
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described as a “complex weave of happenstance and conscious decision-making”63. It 
premiered at Johannesburg’s Market Theatre, whose mission, since 1976, has been to 
“raise the awareness of its mainly white audiences about the oppression of apartheid 
and their own social, political, and economic privileges”64. 
Puppets figure prominently throughout the play, performing the roles of both Apart-
heid’s perpetrators and victims. The use of puppetry is not the only unconventional 
element. At various moments, the performance on stage is interrupted by animated 
films and documentary footage, which either accompany the scene or veer into night-
marish, chaotic sequences of extreme violence.65 
Ubu and the Truth Commission’s story in five acts can be conveyed relatively quickly. 
Pa and Ma Ubu live together, but Ma is suspicious of her husband’s day-job. Pa Ubu 
                                               
worked with them for the Georg Büchner adaptation Woyzeck in the Highveld (1992) and for Faustus in 
Africa (1995). 
63 Lesley Marx, “Slouching towards Bethlehem: Ubu and the Truth Commission,” African Studies 57, 
no. 2 (December 1, 1998): 213, https://doi.org/10.1080/00020189808707896. 
64 Hilary Burns, “The Market Theatre of Johannesburg in the New South Africa,” New Theatre Quarterly 
18, no. 4 (2002): 359, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266464X02000477. 
65 The films, separately assembled in Kentridge’s Ubu Tells the Truth (1997), are produced by using a 
stop-action camera to repeatedly photograph drawings made with charcoal and pastel. See: Nico Israel, 
Spirals: The Whirled Image in Twentieth-Century Literature and Art, Modernist Latitudes (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2015), 190–97; Beschara Sharlene Karam, “Landscapes of the Unconscious 
Mind: A Dialectic of Self and Memory on a Post-Colonial, South African Landscape in the Hand-Ani-
mated, Charcoal-Medium Films of William Kentridge” (University of South Africa, 2011), 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/9999. 
 25 
is in fact employed by the South African police, as the head of a death squad. One of 
his assistants – Niles, a crocodile-puppet – informs him that a truth commission is 
being set up to investigate the crimes under Apartheid: 
PA UBU:  Oh, Niles, such a vision I had. I saw the Great Truth approaching, a 
rope in its hand. It demanded I speak of the truth of our land. 
NILES:  Well, as I understand things, you have a choice. You can take your 
chances, keep silent, and wait to see if the law comes after you. But once 
they have unmasked you, you’ll have to face the music. My advice 
would be to pre-empt it all. I hear there is to be a Commission to deter-
mine Truths, Distortions and Proportions.  
PA UBU:  I’ve heard of Truths and of Distortions, but what are these Proportions 
you talk about? 
NILES:  An inquiry is to be conducted by great and blameless men who meas-
ure what is done, and why, and how.66 
Pa Ubu decides to ignore Niles’s admonition and destroys evidence of his criminal 
misdeeds by feeding papers into the crocodile’s mouth. His further entourage in-
cludes Brutus, a dog-puppet with three heads, like Cerberus, whom we have already 
encountered in the essay’s introduction. Apart from this cast, the other puppets in the 
play recount the verbatim testimonies of Apartheid’s victims, which are transcribed 
from the TRC’s proceedings. These witness accounts are rendered in Xhosa, and then 
translated into English by a second puppet handler. The victim-puppets often share 
the stage with Pa and Ma Ubu when they go about their everyday activities. 
Pa Ubu struggles with the requirement to speak in front of the truth commission, but 
at one point we observe the scene with which this paper began – Brutus’s three heads 
are sentenced differently during their trial. Sarcastically mimicking the TRC’s pro-
grammatic tendency to issue amnesties for those holding positions of power, while 
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severely punishing those who had exerted excess violence, the judge’s verdict also 
pinpoints the TRC’s failure to address Apartheid’s structural violence.67 Following in-
quisitions by the truth commission, the play ends rather abruptly, with Pa and Ma 
sailing off into the sea after being acquitted. 
As anybody who has seen the piece either live or on video will probably confirm, the 
often incoherent and dream-like plot itself is perhaps less intriguing than the multi-
media means by which the story is told. Interpreting Ubu and the Truth Commission 
therefore depends on paying close attention to its formal aspects as well as to its nar-
rative content. I will in the following concentrate on four key motifs: its intertextual 
web of influences; the creative use of puppetry; the transformative pronouncement of 
testimony; and the play’s acknowledgement of the audience’s ambiguous reaction to 
the suffering represented on stage. Together, these themes validate the intuition that 
estrangement is fundamental to our understanding of Ubu and the Truth Commission’ 
power. 
Let us start with an obvious remark about the play’s historical genesis. The protago-
nist, Pa Ubu, is fashioned after the main character in Alfred Jarry’s 1896 piece Ubu Roi, 
which was an important launch board for the surrealist movement, the theatre of the 
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absurd and for aesthetic modernism in the 20th Century more generally.68 Jarry’s Ubu 
is a vulgar creature who defies the conventions of bourgeois serenity and moral dic-
tates. His infantile outlook on the world, garnished by grotesque expletives and scat-
ological asides, is taken up in Taylor’s and Kentridge’s play. Taylor and Kentridge 
were fascinated by the idea of transposing this eccentric and disturbing figure into the 
milieu of today’s South Africa. In locating Pa Ubu in a post-conflict setting, an adjust-
ment was made, however: 
Our purpose, in this play, was to take the Ubu-character out of the burlesque 
context, and place him within a domain in which actions do have conse-
quences. The archaic and artificial language which Ubu uses, with its rhymes, 
its puns, its bombast and its profanities, is set against the detailed and careful 
descriptions of the witness accounts which have been, in large part, transcribed 
from the TRC hearings.69 
While Pa Ubu thus appears unmoved by how his deeds play out in the real world, the 
South African context inevitably modifies the protagonist’s self-understanding. The 
contrast between Pa’s vulgar excesses, frequently interspersed by exculpatory lines 
from Apartheid killers like Dirk Coetzee, and the verbatim testimonies pronounced 
by the victim-puppets is especially stark. It signals the radical break that the transition 
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period needed to negotiate: those who trusted their criminal deeds would remain be-
yond accountability, were summoned by the TRC to overtly explain how their moti-
vations led to concrete atrocities. 
The play hence explores what happens when this enforced injection of conscience is 
curtailed by the consistent failure of perpetrators to see themselves as sharing a com-
mon world with their victims. Just like the actual torturers, Pa Ubu and his accom-
plices are radically lacking in sympathy for their social environment. This goes so far 
that we never witness any violence on stage, just its aftermath: Pa Ubu’s involvement 
in the Apartheid death squad is only retrospectively made visible, when he quickly 
destroys evidence or reeks of the blood spilt in the torture chamber.70 
Secondly, let us inquire into the play’s distinctive use of puppetry. Recall that only Ma 
and Pa Ubu are played by human actors, whereas the rest of the cast are puppets. Jane 
Taylor elucidates this dramaturgic decision in the following way: 
The puppet draws attention to its own artifice, and we as audience willingly 
submit ourselves to the ambiguous processes that at once deny and assert the 
reality of what we watch. They thus very poignantly and compellingly capture 
complex relations of testimony, translation and documentation apparent in the 
processes of the Commission itself.71 
What makes the use of puppetry especially fascinating is that the puppeteers are fully 
observable when they voice the victim accounts; they also serve as each other’s trans-
lators when reciting testimonies in Xhosa. As a consequence, the viewers are automat-
ically drawn to the puppet handler’s face to follow the translation. At one point in the 
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play, the puppeteers even take over as impromptu actors: one victim-puppet’s testi-
mony is interrupted when the handler lets go of the puppet and manipulates it to 
display where on the victim’s head violence was inflicted. In an astonishing exchange, 
reminiscent of the TRC’s inclusion of “comforters” to sooth witnesses in especially 
harrowing moments, the other puppeteer listens attentively and offers solace to the 
interim narrator.72 
This stepping out of the handler’s role provides but one illustration of how the play 
permanently ruptures expectations on the part of the audience. Watching Ma and Pa 
Ubu talk to life-sized, stylized puppets, in a multimedia Gesamtkunstwerk that fuses 
together operatic songs and animated films, makes it impossible to directly empathize 
and identify with what is being shown on stage.73 The use of puppets, impersonating 
both perpetrators and victims, is crucial for attaining this effect. As Olga Taxidou ob-
serves concerning the avant-garde’s fascination with marionettes more generally, “the 
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response it [the puppet] will elicit from its audience will not necessarily be one of em-
pathy and identification; it might be awe and wonder harping back to the puppets’ 
religious roots or it might be one of distance and estrangement”74. 
This point about awe and wonder leads to the third aspect I wish to underscore: how 
the play deals with the testimonies taken from the TRC’s records. Taylor and Ken-
tridge were acutely mindful of the profound ethical dilemmas that any cultural re-
enactment of victim accounts faced: 
What is our responsibility to the people whose stories we are using as raw fod-
der for the play? There seemed to be an awkwardness in getting an actor play 
the witnesses - the audience being caught halfway between having to believe 
in the actor for the sake of the story, and also not believe in the actor for the 
sake of the actual witness who existed out there but was not the actor. Using a 
puppet made this production palpable. There is no attempt to make the audi-
ence think the wooden puppet or its manipulator is the actual witness. The 
puppet becomes the medium through which the testimony can be heard.75 
Ubu and the Truth Commission thus starts with the awareness that drawing on the ver-
batim testimonies of Apartheid victims entails a problematic act of appropriation that 
decontextualizes traumatic suffering for the sake of stagecraft. Puppetry simultane-
ously renders this artistic appropriation visible and uncovers a route towards respon-
sibly expressing first-person narratives: precisely because it does not have a body of 
its own, the puppet manages to enunciate the testimony without distorting its actual 
content. A portrayal of the victims’ experiences by human performers would, on the 
other hand, be inevitably tarnished by the actors’ physical presence. 
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To better comprehend the play’s complexity, we need to keep in mind that testimony 
in transitional justice projects consists not only of truth-telling akin to a public confes-
sion, but also entails a “performative speech act told in a context where its truth-claim 
can produce a conscious, positive effect”76. As observed above, the TRC’s ambitious 
goal was to merge the testimonials’ truth-telling with their therapeutic function, such 
that both the victims themselves and the wider public of bystanders could envisage 
reconciliation as the culmination of the transition period. Ideally, a single narrative of 
admitted wrong-doing and generous forgiveness was supposed to materialize from 
this process of national healing. 
Evidently, Ubu and the Truth Commission is not subject to the same logic of telling an 
over-arching, all-encompassing story. On the contrary, the purpose of artistic engage-
ments with transitional justice “has been the problematizing of different perspectives 
and memories.”77 Pronouncing the actual victim statements on a theatre stage dislo-
cates their performative function such that the audience member is suddenly cast in 
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the “role of active listener, rather than passive spectator”78. Since the viewers know 
about the truth-content of the victim-puppets’ reports, treating the play merely as a 
series of absurd events is not a meaningful option. More likely, the viewers are thrown 
into the uncomfortable position of having to issue a judgement on the perpetrators’ 
and bystanders’ actions. Recovering this ability to think “without a banister” is one of 
the faculties that scholars of transitional justice have identified as pivotal for coming 
to terms with a past of violence.79 
The prompting of active involvement through the “second-order” performativity of 
testimonials brings me to my final point, concerning the way in which ambiguity per-
vades the play. Jane Taylor thematizes this issue succinctly: 
There is […] a sense of ambiguity produced by the play. This is not an ambigu-
ity about the experiences of loss and pain suffered; rather, it is an ambiguity 
about how we respond to such suffering. Our own reactions are questioned, 
because, after all, what is it in us that makes us seek out the stories of another’s 
grief.80  
Taylor’s argument resonates with Kentridge’s assertion, cited in the essay’s epigraph, 
that embracing “ambiguity and contradiction is not to say that one then stops recog-
nizing and condemning things as evil”81. Precisely because political art grapples with 
evil, it must constantly problematize its own modes of production and reception. For 
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the portrayal of severe trauma on stage, screen or paper always carries the risk of 
feeding voyeurism.82 As the puppeteers, Basil Jones and Adrian Kohler, admit, “badly 
handled, such stories could easily become a kind of horror pornography”83. Ubu and 
the Truth Commission faces this challenge by vigorously undercutting appeals to em-
pathy. The fact that puppets channel, rather than embody, victim accounts, demon-
strates how precarious this process is. At its center resides the problem of audience 
identification when confronted with factual testimonies of violations. Through the 
back-and-forth between puppeteers and victim-puppets, the audience members are 
impelled to empathize with the suffering on stage, without ever managing to establish 
an emotional connection with the testimonies. Jill Bennett stresses this constitutive 
contradiction when she points out that 
Ubu […] draws us into a spectacle in which emotions are abundant and conta-
gious; simultaneously faked and deeply felt. […] In this domain, art no longer 
claims to take us into the place of a witness but constitutes this space of encoun-
ter as one in which empathy is, in part, the product of being touched by another 
and, in part, an effect of seeing oneself feeling, catching oneself in the act of act-
ing.84 
To sum up, Ubu and the Truth Commission mobilizes a variety of estrangement devices 
to interrogate the inter-actions of perpetrators and victims in the aftermath of violence. 
The play deals with the difficulty of using verbatim witness accounts as “raw fodder” 
                                               
82 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003); Judith Butler, 
Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London/New York: Verso, 2009). 
83 Basil Jones and Adrian Kohler, “Puppeteers’ Note,” in Ubu and the Truth Commission, by Jane Taylor 
(Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1998), xvi–xvii. 
84 Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art, Cultural Memory in the Present 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 123. 
 34 
by rendering the artificiality of the stagecraft palpable, through an array of animated 
clips, grotesque imagery and documentary footage. An upshot of this method is that 
the audience’s impulsive instinct to identify with the victims is repeatedly frustrated, 
with the effect that critical thinking and transformative self-reflection can hopefully 
gain traction. 
Paradoxically, it is from within the chasm between the viewers and the actors/pup-
pets/puppet handlers that a space for understanding unfolds; feeling for the victims 
alone, perhaps induced exclusively through documentary footage taken from the 
TRC, would not achieve the same world-disclosing outcome, for it would remain 
based on the dubious logic of immersive identification. In the absence of intersecting 
layers of estrangement, the members of the audience might be tempted to imagine 
themselves in the victims’ positions, contemplating what it is like to be tortured and 
maimed – an illusion that seems both phenomenologically questionable and politi-
cally dangerous, due to the victim’s reduction to a mere screen for assimilating suffer-
ing to one’s own lifeworld. 
Given the ever-present temptation of assimilation, we must remain emotionally at dis-
tance from what is being represented to save ourselves from the facile self-deception 
of grasping the horror of human suffering. The play thus estranges us from ourselves 
when we watch how we react, emotionally and intellectually, to the stagecraft; 
through this process of reflection and self-inspection a new beginning can be envi-
sioned. Returning to the distinction made earlier, we can therefore conclude that Ubu 
and the Truth Commission is such a potent play precisely because it estranges the audi-
ence for, rather than from, the world. 
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Resisting Closure 
In the final section, I shall delineate some general conclusions that follow from my 
reading of Ubu and The Truth Commission as a paradigmatic case of world-disclosure 
through estrangement. Recall that defenders of agonistic reconciliation repudiate the 
image of restorative justice as the apex of transitional justice projects. Since many tran-
sitional justice projects, like the TRC, operate on the idealizing assumption that recon-
ciliation crowns the restoration of society to its organic unity, part of what needs to be 
done is to critically probe the extent to which this assumption stands on shaky foun-
dations. Schaap’s insistence that political reconciliation needs to work through persis-
tent conflicts, rather than simply renounce them, points in this direction. 
When a settlement is presented as firmly re-constituting a moral community, it might 
be necessary to try to re-politicize it, even at the risk of deep differences between for-
mer enemies surfacing once again. By re-politicization I mean a continuous declara-
tion of the need for a common world in which agonistic relations are positively up-
held, rather than obfuscated. Counteracting the displacement of politics in the after-
math of violence is hence a major undertaking for the defenders of the agonistic view 
of reconciliation. Attending to negative emotions, apologies and reparations, to re-
iterate the three exemplary modes of agonistic reconciliation rehearsed above, triggers 
re-politicization in this sense. 
Yannis Stavrakakis avers that artists attuned to political issues can back such projects 
of re-politicization, by dismantling the “fetishization and demonization of the enemy 
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figure as an alien intruder destabilizing our supposed harmony.”85 In a post-conflict 
setting, the fraught relationships between perpetrators, bystanders and victims need 
to be re-articulated in such a way that a peaceful future can be collectively imagined. 
As I hope to have demonstrated in this paper, we require proper estrangement devices 
to facilitate the re-politicizing of those settlements that suppress and efface agonistic 
relations. If my argument is accurate, then political art is central to the prospects of 
agonistic reconciliation. 
The discussion of Ubu and the Truth Commission has revealed how estrangement de-
vices may enable us to resist depoliticization. Contesting the official story is based on 
putting both perpetrator stories and victim accounts into a contrasting setting. Depict-
ing the leader of an Apartheid death squad as a thoughtless and farcical brute, who is 
completely incapable of connecting his own deeds to their horrible consequences, al-
lows the viewers to again look into the statements made in front of the TRC and to 
“critique the state supported truth”86. 
In opposition to the chronicling of perpetrator stories, the peculiar staging of victim 
accounts never disputes their truth claims. Only puppets, which do not have human 
bodies, can recite these scripts in such a way that their authenticity is simultaneously 
                                               
85 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Challenges of Re-Politicisation,” Third Text 26, no. 5 (September 1, 2012): 565, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09528822.2012.712771. 
86 Yvette Hutchison, “Post-1990s Verbatim Theatre in South Africa: Exploring an African Concept of 
‘Truth,’” in Dramaturgy of the Real on the World Stage, ed. Carol Martin (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 66. 
 37 
preserved and re-configured for theatrical consumption. This, in turn, makes it imper-
ative for the members of the audience to become “active listeners”, obliging them to 
judge what is being negotiated on stage. Unmediated empathy would likely obstruct 
critical reflection and self-inspection; the emotional identification with the victims 
would nourish a fantasy of universal connectedness that cannot be politically vali-
dated. Just the right kind of distance – what Boym calls estrangement for, rather than 
from the world – generates opportunities for genuine understanding. 
Art works that deploy estrangement devices are highly demanding of the audience. 
As should be evident from my description, Ubu and the Truth Commission is not exactly 
light, easily accessible entertainment. What makes these art works difficult is their 
propensity to deliberately create unease and discomfort on the part of the viewers. 
Since they rely on estrangement, rather than catharsis, plays like Ubu and the Truth 
Commission take us beyond ourselves; they shake the comfortable position of our ac-
quired knowledge and question that which seems most fixed and stable to us. 
Interestingly, estrangement for, rather than from, the world can touch audiences in un-
expected ways. Although the story of Ubu and the Truth Commission has nothing to do 
with Romania, where the transitional period after the fall of the communist regime 
looked very different from South Africa’s, Kentridge remembers the following en-
counter: 
After a performance, a woman came up to us, obviously moved by what she 
had seen. She said she was from Romania. We expressed surprise that the play 
had been accessible to her as it was so local in its content. “That’s it,” she said. 
“It is so local. So local. This play is written about Romania.”87 
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A critic could object that the reception of the play, and of estrangement more gener-
ally, will vary considerably, depending on who sits in the auditorium and who acts 
on stage: certain groups, such as beneficiaries, for example, might be wooed to change 
their perspective on the reassuring truths about perpetrators, avowed by the TRC. But 
victims and survivors might feel very differently about a fictional narrative that ap-
propriates their experiences in a defamiliarizing and satirizing manner. Recall, for in-
stance, that Pa Ubu is throughout portrayed as a silly figure, whose pronouncements 
simultaneously provoke revulsion and ridicule. Victims and survivors will perhaps 
perceive the use of estrangement devices as a humiliating disparagement of their suf-
fering. 
This rejoinder cuts to the core of my argument. In response, a caveat on my proposal 
seems apposite. While this essay has not attempted to scrutinize the real-world impact 
of Ubu and the Truth Commission, it certainly appears true that estrangement will not 
always deliver the most appropriate mechanism for achieving world-disclosure. To 
clarify, my argument has not been that estrangement offers a universally applicable 
formula to address the thorny problem of coming to terms with historical violence. 
Rather, what the play’s interpretation brings to light is that, in certain moments, es-
trangement devices are indispensable to perturb naïve, one-dimensional records of 
the past and to rekindle societal conversations about transitional justice. By undoing 
settled meanings and conventional understandings, political art – when concerned 
with ambiguity and contradiction – creates distance and renews the spectators’ orien-
tation towards a common world. 
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In response to the objection, I hence contend that my vindication of a particular form 
of estrangement leaves sufficient space for alternative kinds of re-enactment that en-
courage other variants of “democratic political education”. Once again, the South Af-
rican context provides an illustration of this proposal. While Ubu and the Truth Com-
mission will arguably be most impactful on those viewers who display a simplistic 
grasp of the involvement of both perpetrators and bystanders in authoritarian socie-
ties, other types of theatre might speak to different groups, directly involving victims 
and showing solidarity with those still agonizing.88 For example, the Khulumani Sup-
port Group dramatized the transitional process in a unique fashion, through their 
play The Story I Am about to Tell, performed by three survivors who had earlier testified 
before the TRC. The play is as much about survivors’ awareness-raising and self-em-
powerment, as it forcefully articulates one of Khulumani Support Group’s core de-
mands: fundamental redress for the wrongs of Apartheid.89 As Stephanie Marlin-
Curiel writes: 
By traveling to far-reaching townships and rural areas, The Story I am About to 
Tell let other people suffering in silence know that they were not alone, while 
also offering a model of how to survive. While allegedly a play about encour-
aging people to go to the TRC, it also embodied a critique of the TRC by per-
forming outside the TRC’s institutional framework. For the Khulumani mem-
bers who elected to participate in The Story, this exercise in repetition success-
fully reversed any perceptions of their victimhood. Repeating their stories in 
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public meant taking an active role in their own healing and helping to heal 
others.90 
Despite its advancing in the opposite direction from Ubu and the Truth Commission, the 
Khulumani Support Group, too, rejects crude didacticism. The lessons to draw from 
cultural re-enactments are, hence, never straightforward. 
As the juxtaposition between these opposing types of theatre-making corroborates, 
the power of the “political art par excellence” – theatre – is today more fragmented 
and diffuse than in Arendt’s original example, Ancient Greece, where drama’s in-
tended aim was the instruction of an audience that, in principle, extended to the entire 
polis.91 But this fragmentation and diffusion does not diminish the great potential that 
theatre still harbors: to make some of us see things differently. 
Undoubtedly, this is a risky and uncertain endeavor, which many would want to es-
chew under all circumstances. After all, inspirational stories of national healing are 
much more soothing than the relentless probing of ambiguities and contradictions. 
Yet, avoidance comes at a high cost, as Arendt has taught us: apathy, distrust and 
anxiety reign supreme in a “worldless” polity where the essential pluralism of human 
relations has been abolished. This is why asserting the agonistic character of politics 
in general, and of reconciliation in particular, is ultimately inevitable. Art can help us 
in approximating this goal, by keeping optimism in check and nihilism at bay (to par-
aphrase Kentridge once again). 
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